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Differences in Psychological Strategies of
Failed and Operational Business Owners
in the Fiji Islands*
by Jean-Louis van Gelder, Reinout E. de Vries, Michael Frese,
and Jan-Peter Goutbeek
This study investigates the differences between failed and operational businesses
from a psychological perspective. The sample included 71 operational and 20 failed
business owners from Suva, the capital of Fiji. It was hypothesized that operational
business owners more often employ a detailed and long-term planning strategy,
whereas failed business owners more often pursue a reactive strategy, that operational
business owners set more specific and more difficult goals, and that they have a higher
degree of human capital than failed entrepreneurs. The data were analyzed using
discriminant analysis. Results confirmed the hypotheses regarding planning and goal
specificity.
Introduction
This paper empirically investigates the
psychological action strategies, goals,
and human capital of business owners
who have failed and compare this group
to a group of operational business
owners (that is, “surviving” or nonfailed
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business owners; we will use the term
“operational” in combination with busi-
nesses or business owners throughout
the text).
Research on small business failure can
be divided into studies focusing on exter-
nal factors and studies focusing on inter-
nal factors influencing business failure
or survival. Organizational ecology, for
example, is concerned with external, or
exogenous, factors influencing business
survival such as risks engendered by
international and national economic con-
ditions and the industry in which these
businesses are operating (Everett and
Watson 1998). Population ecologists
have been examining the life span of
large numbers of organizations under
varying environmental conditions (for
example, Carroll and Hannan 2000;
Bruederl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler
1992; Singh and Lumsden 1990; Hannan
and Freeman 1984; Caroll and Delacroix
1982; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton
1981) and have established lawful rela-
tionships between age of businesses
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Romanelli 1989),
size of businesses (Bruederl, Preisendör-
fer, and Ziegler 1992), and population
density (Caroll and Delacroix 1982), on
the one hand, and business survival
rates, on the other. Though these studies
have increased our knowledge on busi-
ness failure, the ecological approach
generally treats business owners as black
boxes, at the neglect of psychological,
internal, or endogenous factors that may
be important predictors of small business
failure or success. As Sutton (1990, p.
206) pointed out: “[p]sychological per-
spectives were used less frequently in
theory building and research on the
causes and consequences of decline.”
The distinction between internal and
external causes has major practical impli-
cations because “if the underlying causes
of small businesses are predominantly
internal . . . then government policy
would be best directed at the level of the
firm; for example by providing training
and education programs and support
agencies. If the underlying causes are
predominantly external . . . then govern-
ment policy would be best directed at
changing the economic environment
within which small business operates”
(Fredland and Morris 1976, cited from
(Everett and Watson 1998, p. 371). The
aim of the current study is to look at
internal factors influencing business
failure by investigating psychological dif-
ferences between failed and operational
entrepreneurs from a psychological per-
spective. Research on this topic is rare,
and even more rare is research that actu-
ally takes the person of the entrepreneur
as a starting point. As Castrogiovanni
(1996) notes, “[B]iases toward survey
research contribute to this deficiency
because non-survivors tend to get
excluded from survey research samples”
(p. 819). One of the most prominent
reasons for this relative absence is the
difficulty in finding failed entrepreneurs
who are also willing to be interviewed
on their former business.
In order to examine the differences
between operational small business
owners and failed business owners, we
focus on psychological strategy process
characteristics of business owners ac-
cording to an approach suggested
by Frese, Van Gelderen, and Ombach
(2000). Process characteristics refer to
how owners formulate and implement a
strategy. Frese, Van Gelderen, and
Ombach (2000) distinguish five different
strategies: (1) reactive, (2) opportunistic,
(3) critical point, (4) complete plan-
ning, and (5) habit. The two main dimen-
sions that underlie their taxonomy are
planning and proactivity.
A reactive strategy is neither charac-
terized by proactivity nor by planning
and implies that the business owner is
being driven by the situation. A reactive
strategy further implies that the owner is
not goal oriented and does not actively
attempt to influence the situation. An
opportunistic strategy is proactive; busi-
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ness owners who use this strategy scan
the environment for opportunities. An
opportunistic strategy may start out with
some form of rudimentary goal setting
and planning but may deviate easily from
these goals and plans once other oppor-
tunities appear (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-
Roth 1979). Little planning and goal
setting characterize both reactive and
opportunistic strategies. However, an
opportunistic strategy implies a higher
level of proactivity than that of a reactive
strategy.
Critical point and complete planning
strategies are both proactive and plan-
ning oriented. When applying a critical
point strategy, one plans for the most
difficult, unclear, and important points
and acts on these without planning other
issues. In contrast, complete planning
strategy uses a long time frame to plan
ahead, a large inventory of signals, and a
clear knowledge and anticipation of
error situations. The fifth strategy, habit,
cannot really be termed a strategy, but it
is a fallback category that applies to
people who rely on routines to manage
their business.
The approach described in the previ-
ous discussion explores what owners do
in order to achieve their business goals.
According to this approach, small busi-
ness owners regulate and control their
own actions by setting goals and devel-
oping action strategies in order to
achieve these goals (Frese and Zapf
1994). It is essentially a psychological
view on business success and failure
because it considers both endogenous
short- and long-term business goals (for
example, a few days to a few years) and
the behavioral strategies to attain them as
shown through the owners’ actions
rather than their written and formalized
strategy plans. It is possible to use the
level of analysis of owners’ strategies
(instead of the organizational level)
because owners of small and micro busi-
nesses usually determine all major deci-
sions of their business themselves, either
directly (e.g., because they make the
decision and even implement it) or
indirectly (e.g., because they employ a
person they think is doing a good job or
supervise how to do the job).
Acting proactively can lead to changes
in the environment, if ever so slightly.
For example, if a business owner
attempts to satisfy wishes of customers
proactively, the customers are more
likely to be, in turn, more loyal to his or
her business. Consequently, the competi-
tive environment for this owner may
become somewhat more munificent. In
contrast, acting reactively does not shape
the environment, does not involve long-
term consequences, does not lead to the
development of pre-signals to ward off
potential problems, and does not usually
result in the development of enough
cues to understand and interpret reality.
In short, acting reactively is more likely
to cause underperformance of the
business.
Once a reactive business owner
notices that he or she performs worse
than his or her competitors, a threat-
rigidity process can set in (Staw, Sand-
elands, and Dutton 1981). In our context,
it means that underperformance leads
to the experience of stress. Feelings
of stress narrow the perceptual field,
leading to increased attention to the most
salient or dominant environmental cues
and signals, which, in turn, exacerbate
the reactive responses of business
owners. This theoretical view of a vicious
cycle explains the empirical finding of a
longitudinal study in the Netherlands,
which showed that a reactive approach
predicted low business performance and
that low business performance predicted
a reactive approach (Van Gelderen and
Frese 1998). Consequently, our first
hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Failed business owners use
Reactive strategy more often
than successful business own-
ers do.
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The alternative strategies—complete
planning, critical point planning, and
opportunistic—are all proactive. In each
case, the owners anticipate possible
future problems and actively deal with
these potential problem situations. In
addition, complete planning and critical
point planning are different from the
opportunistic strategy because the
former two share an emphasis on struc-
ture, action plans, and goal setting (Frese
and Van Gelderen 2000). We assume that
these two strategies contribute to success
because planning helps to anticipate
negative events and allows ready-made
back-up plans in case something goes
wrong. Additionally, an opportunistic
strategy may also be successful because
it implies, as both others, a proactive
approach to the environment, changing
it to become more munificent. Business
owners who use a proactive strategy
actively attack problems instead of
letting them linger, thereby increasing
their chance for success. Consequently,
higher levels of planning and proactivity
should be associated with a lower fre-
quency of failure.
H2: Failed business owners use
less complete planning, critical
point planning, and opportu-
nistic strategy than successful
business owners do.
Apart from adequate strategies, clear
and long-term goals are also important.
Locke and Latham (2002) identify four
mechanisms through which goals regu-
late human action. First of all, goals
direct activities toward those that are
most likely to lead to goal fulfillment.
Second, goals energize a person to
exert effort. Third, goals affect persis-
tence in the face of failure. Finally,
goals trigger the use of task-relevant
knowledge and strategies. According to
goal theory, specific and difficult goals
increase performance, whereas no
goals, less specific goals or “easy goals”
decrease performance (Locke et al.
1981). Therefore, setting high and spe-
cific goals is more likely to lead to
higher levels of proactivity, which in
turn will affect performance positively,
as has been shown repeatedly in
empirical studies on goal theory (Locke
and Latham 2002; Locke and Latham
1990; Locke et al. 1981).
H3: Failed business owners set
lower and less specific goals
than successful business own-
ers do.
Further prerequisites to develop
adequate strategies are sufficient knowl-
edge and a well-developed mental model
of the business products, production and
marketing processes, its environment,
etc. (Gentner and Stevens 1983). This is
one of the reasons why high human
capital is related to entrepreneurial
success and why lack of human capital is
related to failure (Gimeno et al. 1997;
Bruederl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler
1992). Human capital (education, devel-
opment of skills) encourages the devel-
opment of adequate mental models,
which in turn contributes to entrepre-
neurial success. However, it is very dif-
ficult to develop adequate mental models
in stress situations. For instance, D’aveni
and MacMillan (1990) found that manag-
ers of declining firms are prone to deny
a crisis in their business; in contrast with
managers of successful firms, they tend
to focus more on the input environment,
shifting, for instance, the blame to sup-
pliers rather than on the output environ-
ment, which is harder to control. Thus,
as was the case with a reactive strategy,
low human capital may, through an
underdeveloped mental model and
through higher levels of stress, be
responsible for a narrow focus on the
most salient information at the cost of
other information that may also be vital
to an organization’s survival. This brings
us to our final hypothesis:
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H4: Failed business owners have a
lower degree of human capital
than successful business own-
ers do.
Setting: Fiji Islands
The setting of this study is the Repub-
lic of Fiji, a nation consisting of more
than 300 small islands in the South
Pacific at 17 degrees latitude south of the
equator and crossing the meridian at 180
degrees longitude. The population is
mostly concentrated on one of the three
main islands, Viti Levu, which houses the
capital, Suva. Fiji’s main industries are
tourism, sugar cane, and textile, but it
has additional potential for small-scale
enterprises in the areas of retail, service,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
One of the biggest impediments to
economic growth is the ethnic tension
between the two main population
groups in Fiji, that is, between
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians (De
Vries 2002). Poor laborers from mainland
India were brought to Fiji at the end of
the 19th century and at the beginning of
the 20th century by the British, who
ruled Fiji until 1974, to work in the sug-
arcane industry. Although tension is not
always visible, the two groups widely
differ on religious, economic, and socio-
cultural grounds. Additionally, indig-
enous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have
distinct stereotypical views of each
other (De Vries, 2004), reinforcing the
socioeconomic gap between the two
groups. The perceived economic suc-
cesses and political aspirations of the
Indo-Fijian population have created
overt resentment in the indigenous Fiji
population, which has resulted in four
political coups: two in 1987, one in 2000,
and one in 2006.1 The first three coups
resulted in governments dominated by
indigenous Fijians. The coups have also
led to repercussions; the 1987 coup, for
instance, has led to a reduction in over-
seas investments, a devaluation of the
Fiji-dollar, falling foreign reserves, a
reduction in export earnings, and a
freeze of aid donors on future aid com-
mitments (Asia Yearbook 1997; Hailey
1988).
One of the main priorities of the
indigenous Fijian governments follow-
ing both coups was to stimulate
Indigenous entrepreneurship. Successful
Indigenous businesses, it was believed,
would lead to a reduction in the dispar-
ity between the two ethnic groups and
would eventually reconcile the two
groups’ interests. This line of reasoning
is far from irrational. In the South
Pacific region, entrepreneurship and its
potential for promoting the develop-
ment of local economies are at the fore-
front of operational development
thinking (Fiji Development Bank 1998;
Fairbairn 1988). Several authors have
indicated that a strong small business
sector encourages economic growth and
increases employment (Rauch and Frese
2000; Fairbairn 1988; Loucks 1988).
Thus, stimulating entrepreneurship has
not only the prospect of stimulating
growth in a fragile Island economy; it is
also likely to create a more balanced
economic structure between the two
groups and promote self-reliance of
indigenous Fijians (Fairbairn 1988).
Method
Sample
The sample comprised a group of
business owners who at the time of study
were still operating, and a group of busi-
ness owners who had ceased operations.
We termed these two groups respectively
operational and failed business owners.
The following selection criteria were
used to sample business owners from
both groups: First, participants had to be
(or have been) the owner of the busi-
1The data for this study were gathered just prior to the 2000 coup.
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ness. Second, the business had to be
established between 1985 and 1995.
Third, in order to get a clear overview of
the development and success of the busi-
ness, the business had to have existed for
at least three years. Finally, the number
of employees of the business had to be
more than 1 and less than 50 at any one
time during operations.
In our view, business failure implies
being forced to cease operations as an
organization due to a lack of resources
and/or financial distress. This excludes
selling one’s business, merging, or stop-
ping it because there are better alterna-
tives (which may also include a position
as employee). It is usually difficult to
locate and motivate failed business
owners to participate in research on a
topic that is painful or even aversive to
them. In our case, failed business owners
were located with the assistance of the
Fiji Development Bank (FDB). A register
of loans that were written off was used in
order to check if a business owner had
gone out of business. For privacy
reasons, an employee from the FDB con-
tacted the failed business owners by tele-
phone. The potential participants were
informed that the interview would be
conducted by someone from outside the
bank, that no personal data would be
communicated to the bank, and that
the researchers were interested in the
reasons why the failed entrepreneurs
went out of business and in suggestions
to help government and banks prevent
entrepreneurs from going bankrupt. In
the case when a failed business owner
was willing to participate, he or she was
contacted by one of the researchers.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on
how many failed business owners
refused to participate because the
employees of the FDB did not record the
rejection rate.2
For the group of operational business
owners, the yellow pages, registers of
the Fiji Small Business Advisory Unit,
and the Fiji Trade and Investment Board
were used to locate the firms. Of all the
participants who fit the criteria, 83
percent agreed to participate. Together,
the two samples included 20 (18 male, 2
female) failed business owners and 71
operational entrepreneurs (64 male and
7 female). Data from the FDB show that
the rate of success of Indo-Fijian and
indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs differs
considerably (FDB, personal communi-
cation). For instance, in the period
between 1999 and 2002, although 376
indigenous Fijian versus 671 Indo-Fijian
business plans got approved, 127 of the
indigenous Fijian versus 94 of the Indo-
Fijian business plans in the same period
failed. If we compare approvals to write-
offs in the same period, 50 percent of the
amount of the approved loans to indig-
enous Fijians was written off versus 20
percent of the amount approved to Indo-
Fijians. Therefore, it is not surprising that
we were not able to obtain a fully
matched sample. In the operational
group there were 21 percent indigenous
Fijians versus 79 percent nonindigenous
Fijians (Indo-Fijians and others). In the
failed group, the addresses of which
were provided by the FDB, it was even
harder to obtain nonindigenous Fijians:
90 percent of the owners were of Fijian
descent and 10 percent of non-Fijian
descent. Consequently, it was impossible
to conduct separate analyses for the
ethnic groups because sample size pro-
hibits meaningful comparison.3 All par-
ticipants were (former) owners of formal
and registered businesses that employed
2We were unable to obtain financial data on failed entrepreneurs because of the sensitive nature
of the subject.
3There was a significant interaction between ethnic groups and failed and operational entre-
preneurs (c2 = (1, N = 91) = 32.03, p < .01).
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between 1 and 50 people. The mean age
of the failed businesses was 7.7 years
and the participants’ age was 46 years on
average. The group of operational busi-
nesses existed on average for 7.1 years.
The mean age of these participants was
41 years.
Procedure
Data were gathered by means of a
structured interview, which took
between 60 and 90 minutes. Interviews
were coded on the same day as they
were taken. Forty randomly selected
interviews were coded twice to check for
inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater reliabili-
ties were determined with Pearson’s r for
the scales, Spearman’s r for the ordinal
variables, and Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen
1968) for nominal variables according to
a formula by Landis and Koch (1977).
Operationalization
Strategies (reactive, habit, oppor-
tunistic, critical point, and complete
planning) were measured based on
the operationalization by Frese, Van
Gelderen, and Ombach (2000) using a
structured behavior event interview pro-
cedure (Spencer and Spencer 1993). For
the two groups, slightly different inter-
views were used. Operational business
owners were asked about the strategies
they employed with regard to their two
main operational business goals. For the
failed group, the retrospective questions
regarded the two most important goals
the business owner had at any one time
when still in business. Both groups were
asked about their subgoals, how they
went (or had gone about) about achiev-
ing them, and what they had done to
achieve their goals. To facilitate diagno-
sis of the strategies, prompts were used
to stimulate the participants to be as con-
crete as possible. Furthermore, care was
taken not to suggest any terminology
that was related to our concepts of
the strategies (e.g., “planning,” “active”).
First, two nominal variables—for each
main goal one—were constructed, each
consisting of five answering categories
reflecting the five different planning
strategies. Thus, for each of the two
goals, only one of the five strategies
could be rated. The inter-rater reliability
of the two raters coding the strategies
was an acceptable 0.65. In the rare cases
a participant did not clearly have a
second business goal or basically
repeated what he said about his first
business goal, the missing value was sub-
stituted by the value on the first goal.
The five strategy indexes were con-
structed via a dummy variable proce-
dure. The scores for both goals were
added for each strategy; thus, each
person could get a score of 0, 1 or 2 on
each of the strategy characteristics. As
each score was either a 1 (applicable) or
a 0 (not applicable), the final strategy
scores could range from 2 (that is, using
the same strategy for the two goals) to 0
(that is, this strategy not applicable
regarding either one of the two goals).
Goal Setting
During the interview, participants
were asked about the level of detail of
their goals, the difficulty of their goals,
and the number of obstacles they
expected to encounter. For the failed
group, this pertained to the obstacles
they had encountered. The interviewers
double rated all questions and partici-
pants were given a score on a five-point
Likert scale. Inter-rater reliabilities for
goal specificity and goal difficulty were
0.74 and 0.85, respectively.
Human Capital
Two indexes for measuring human
capital were constructed: an education
index and an experience index. The
experience index consisted of experi-
ence as a business owner, previous expe-
rience in the same business sector, and,
in order to ascertain whether or not the
entrepreneur was already acquainted
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with business in childhood, parental
entrepreneurial experience. Formal edu-
cation distinguishes between primary
school, secondary school, Fiji Institute of
Technology/college, and university. The
Fiji Institute of Technology is a college-
type degree that provides any type of
formal and full-time education that one
can engage in after finishing high school,
aside from university. It is of a lower
educational level than the university and
is more technology oriented.
Analysis
Discriminant analysis was employed
to differentiate the two groups of failed
and operational entrepreneurs. We
tested the significance of the discrimi-
nant function using Wilks’s lambda. To
interpret the amount of explained vari-
ance, the square of the canonical corre-
lation, which is equivalent to the eta
square in the analysis of variance, was
computed. Classification results were
obtained to determine how many people
were actually classified correctly based
on the variables included in the disrimi-
nant function. According to Stevens
(1992), one should take caution when
interpreting the discriminant variables
when the N/p ratio is lower than 20 to 1.
Stevens (1992) suggested interpreting
the standardized canonical discriminant
function coefficients as well as the cor-
relations between variables and the dis-
criminant function (the latter is parallel
to factor loadings in factor analysis)
when the N/p ratio is below 20 to 1. As
our N/p ratio in this research was 11 to 1,
both methods of interpreting the dis-
criminant results were used. Those vari-
ables in the discriminant function with
the highest correlations between the dis-
criminant function and the discriminant
variables as well as the variables with the
highest standardized coefficients are the
variables on which the two groups are
separated best (Stevens 1992).
Because of the ipsative nature of the
strategy variables, it is impossible to
conduct discriminant analysis using all of
the strategy variables. As noted previ-
ously, the habit strategy is not really a
strategy but a fallback category consist-
ing of behavior based on routine opera-
tion procedures. We found habit not to
be related to whether the business had
failed or survived (r = 0.05, p = .68).
Therefore, for methodological and theo-
retical reasons, it was decided to omit
habit from the discriminant analysis.
Results
To test the differences between the
operational entrepreneurs and the failed
entrepreneurs, a discriminant analysis
was employed, in which we expected
operational entrepreneurs to score
higher on complete planning, critical
point, and opportunistic strategies, goal
specificity and goal difficulty and human
capital (education and experience), and
to score lower on reactive strategy.
Overall, a significant Wilks’s lambda
for the discriminant function was
found (L = 0.74, p < .01). The amount of
explained variance was 0.26. Classifica-
tion results showed that 80.2 percent of
the subjects were classified correctly by
the discriminant function. This means
that the psychological variables used in
this study successfully discriminate
between these two groups of business
owners.
The standardized canonical discrimi-
nant function coefficients (lower left
column in Table 1) shows that the vari-
ables that contribute most in distinguish-
ing between the failed and operational
small business owners are goal specific-
ity, reactive strategy, experience, oppor-
tunistic strategy, and complete planning.
Goal difficulty, critical point planning,
and educational level do not make a
strong contribution in the discrimination
between the two groups. Substantive
interpretation of the discriminant func-
tion was obtained by means of the corre-
lations between the variables and the
discriminant function and the group
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means on the variables. Strong negative
correlations (r < -0.40) between the dis-
criminant function and the variables were
found for goal specificity, experience,
and the complete planning strategy
variable. A strong positive correlation
(r > 0.40) was found between the dis-
criminant function and reactive strategy.
The test of equality of group means on
the variables confirmed the given pattern.
Operational business owners scored
higher than failed business owners on
goal specificity (resp. mo = 0.16,
sdo = 0.80 vs. mf = -0.63, sdf = 0.79,
L = 0.85, F(1,86) = 15.16, p < .01), expe-
rience (resp. mo = 2.35, sdo = 0.75 versus
mf = 1.80, sdf = 0.83, L = 0.92, F(1,86)
= 8.01, p < .01), and complete plan-
ning (resp. mo = 0.88, sdo = 0.92 versus
mf = 0.35, sdf = 0.67, L = 0.94, F(1,86) =
5.74, p = .02), and operational business
owners scored lower than failed business
owners on reactive strategy (resp.
mo = 0.60, sdo = 0.82 versus mf = 0.12,
sdf = 0.41, L = 0.87, F(1,86) = 12.96,
p < .01). The discriminant analysis shows
that operational entrepreneurs set more
specific goals, have more experience,
apply a complete planning strategy more
often and a reactive strategy less often
than failed entrepreneurs. No significant
differences between operational and
failed entrepreneurs were observed on
the means of education, goal difficulty,
critical point planning, and reactive strat-
egy (results of the tests of equality of
group means for these variables are
reported in Table 1).
Table 1
Distinction between Failed and Operational
Business Owners on the Predictor Variables Using
Discriminant Analysis
Eigenvalue R2 Chi2 Wilks’ L p
Discriminant 0.36 0.26 24.97 0.74 0.00
Function
Functions at group centroids:
Group mean failed business owners: 1.09 (N = 20)
Group mean operational business owners: -0.32 (N = 71)
80.2 percent correctly classified
Coefficientsa Correlationsb Wilks’s Lc F p
Reactive 0.48 0.65 0.87 12.96 0.00
Opportunistic 0.40 0.25 0.98 1.97 0.16
Critical Point -0.11 -0.29 0.97 2.49 0.12
Complete 0.25 -0.43 0.94 5.74 0.02
Specificity -0.59 -0.70 0.85 15.16 0.00
Difficulty 0.14 0.27 0.98 2.22 0.14
Experience -0.42 -0.51 0.92 8.01 0.01
Education -0.02 -0.12 0.99 0.42 0.52
aStandardized canonical discriminant function coefficients.
bPooled within-groups correlations between the variables and the discriminant
function.
cTests the equality of group means on the variables (with df1/df2 = 1/86).
JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT396
Discussion
This study compared operational
entrepreneurs with failed entrepreneurs
on strategy process characteristics, goal
setting, and human capital. An attempt
was made to distinguish psychological
factors that could discriminate between
these two groups. The discriminant
analysis, differentiating between opera-
tional and failed entrepreneurs, showed
strong support for the hypotheses
regarding complete planning and reac-
tive strategies, but not for critical point
planning and opportunistic strategy.
Failed entrepreneurs use complete
planning less frequently and reactive
strategies more frequently than those
entrepreneurs who are still in business.
No effects were found for critical point
and opportunistic strategies.
Our second hypothesis on goal diffi-
culty and goal specificity stated that failed
entrepreneurs had set lower and less spe-
cific goals than did operational entrepre-
neurs. This hypothesis was confirmed for
goal specificity, but not for goal difficulty.
Operational entrepreneurs set more spe-
cific goals than failed entrepreneurs but
did not set more difficult goals. One
reason for the lack of support for goal
difficulty may be attributed to our opera-
tionalization. In this study, goal difficulty
was assessed by asking the entrepreneur
how difficult he thought it was to reach
his main business goals. It was therefore
the perception of the business owner
accounting for the difficulty of the goal.
This perception may not reflect the actual
goal difficulty level.
Finally, there was equivocal support
for our hypotheses on human capital;
failed entrepreneurs had somewhat less
business experience than operational
entrepreneurs, but the function coeffi-
cient for experience was not high and, in
addition, the coefficient for education
was not significant.
This study has the following limita-
tions. The most important limitation is
the retrospective nature of this study.
Due to the time lag between the gather-
ing of the data and the period that the
failed entrepreneurs still held their busi-
nesses, it is possible that the business
owners were not accurate in their report-
ing behavior. We attempted to limit this
problem by holding the time lag between
failure and data collection to a maximum
of three years. The interviews about past
events might have contributed to reinter-
pretations on the part of the failed busi-
ness owners. However, there are reasons
to believe that this is less likely.
Attribution research shows that people
have self-serving assignment of blame
(Kingdon 1967). If entrepreneurs reinter-
preted past events, the most likely rein-
terpretations would be to make outside
events, not their own action strategies,
responsible for the failure. However, we
found precisely action strategies to be
the most important discriminators
between the two groups.
A second limitation is the fact that the
interviewers knew in advance whether
they had to interview an operational
entrepreneur or if they had to interview a
failed entrepreneur. Although this is
impossible to prevent in this kind of
study, it may have contributed to inter-
viewer bias. However, the interviewers
were trained to conduct structured inter-
views. Research shows that this kind of
training is less likely to result in inter-
viewer errors (Arvey and Murphy 1998).
Consequently, we do not believe this will
have resulted in a considerable impact
on the results. Additionally, there are
some factors that may have mitigated the
positive effects found.
One problem of our design was the
fact that the comparison group of opera-
tional entrepreneurs is not a pure group.
We were therefore careful to call this
group operational entrepreneurs and not
successful entrepreneurs. Simply being
in business is not necessarily a sign of
success. Failing organizations can still be
operative for quite a long time because
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there are other reasons to continue on
with the organization, such as deriv-
ing prestige from self-employment
(DeTienne, Shepherd, and DeCastro
2002; McGrath 1999; Meyer and Zucker
1989). This problem diminishes the like-
lihood to find significant differences
between the two groups. Another factor
decreasing the chance to find significant
result is the size of our sample; the group
of failed entrepreneurs only consisted of
20 participants. Therefore, the test con-
ducted in this study is fairly conservative;
with a bigger sample and a clearer dis-
tinction between failed and successful
business owners, stronger results would
have been obtained. The fact that we
did find interesting and statistically
significant differentiators between the
two groups adds to the strength of the
study.
In general, it would have been better
to get longitudinal data in which actual
prediction of failure can be calculated
and in which no retrospective reporting
needs to be done. However, dropout
rates and nonresponse make such
studies very hard to conduct, which may
explain the low numbers of longitudinal
studies in this field of research and the
even lower number of longitudinal
studies in developing countries.
This study has a number of implica-
tions for theory and practice. As stated in
the introduction, when reviewing factors
contributing to small business survival or
failure we should make the distinction
between internal factors, attributable to
the firm, and external factors, attribut-
able, for example, to industry char-
acteristics or population density. This
distinction has important policy implica-
tions. “If most of the heterogeneity
across firms is attributable to factors spe-
cific to the industry, there is little that
public policy can do in reducing firm
failure rates. On the other hand, if firm-
specific factors result in heterogeneity
with respect to survival rates, an impor-
tant implication is that public policy can
have a positive impact in reducing the
likelihood of failure” (Audretsch,
Houweling, and Thurik 1997, p. 1). The
empirical evidence provided in this
paper suggests that internal factors can
have a considerable influence on sur-
vival, and public policy should thus
(also) be directed at finding instruments
of small business support to increase the
likelihood of survival.
The implications for developing coun-
tries in general, and Fiji in particular, are
clear. If endogenous and psychological
variables are important in survival and
success, most effort should be devoted
by governments and banks in selecting
and training potential entrepreneurs on
planning and goal-setting strategies. In
Fiji, in which indigenous Fijians have
less experience with entrepreneurship
and, consequently, are perhaps more
likely to fail as entrepreneurs, such selec-
tion and training efforts have great
urgency. As De Vries (2004) shows,
not only do Indo-Fijians stereotype
indigenous Fijians as lazy, uncompeti-
tive, and less ambitious, but indigenous
Fijians also share this stereotype of their
own ingroup, although self-ratings show
that they think it is not true of them-
selves. Group stereotypes such as these
may have a negative impact of lowering
social expectations and increasing antici-
pations of failure of indigenous Fijians in
banks, the government, and the commu-
nity as a whole, thereby inducing a nega-
tive spiral of self-fulfilling failure beliefs.
This, in turn, may exacerbate the rela-
tions between the ethnic groups in Fiji,
creating jealousy and resentment of
Indo-Fijians in indigenous Fijians, and
fear and reproach of indigenous Fijians
in Indo-Fijians. The ensuing conflict
cycle, which in Fiji has a sociocultural as
well as an economic background (De
Vries 2002), can be abated by adequate
and systematic selection and training
efforts to aid individual entrepreneurs
and reduce the chance of business
failures.
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